

## **Annexe 5**

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# The Sirens of « Malaga »

## Impact of the CCTV system of the Belgian National Railway Company on the conduct of police investigators

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*This paper gives an account of some results stemming from a study based on the analysis of empirical data collected by means of interviews and direct observations inside the PC-video control room of the Belgian National Railway Company (SNCB). It shows the growing impact of the SNCB CCTV system (3000 cameras in 51 stations in a vast plan, named « Malaga ») on the criminal investigation practices of the railway police and of some local police bodies. Moreover, the author observes that this impact results from an SNCB strategy aiming at further confronting the criminal investigation logic on its own spatial territorium. This strategy is ultimately set up to make the SNCB spaces as threatening as possible for individuals, considered "to present a risk".*

### 1. Introduction

The research results we want to submit in this paper are part of a wider PhD project<sup>2</sup> inscribed in an analytic framework centred around the concept of 'governmentality'. Originally developed by Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1994a [1978], p. 655; 1994b [1984], p. 728; 1994c [1984], p. 785), this concept refers to a range of activities intended to guide, to influence or to affect the conduct of one or more people (Gordon, 1991). The research contributes to a better understanding of the practices used in the Occidental societies to direct the populations or individuals actions, or « to conduct the conducts » in a literal translation of Foucault's words.

In this theoretical context emerged the following hypothesis: since a couple of decades our modern societies are subject of a transformation process of the social regulation ('governmentality'). This process is characterised by moving from an ideal of treatment

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of deviance (Welfare State) to a logic of risk management (advanced liberal State). More precisely the objective is now more focused on managing groups considered « at risk », rather than trying to normalise deviant individuals (Simon, 1987; Feeley and Simon, 1992; O'Malley, 1992; 1999; Brion, 2005; 2006). In parallel with this redefinition of the social regulation we are witnessing the growing implication of new technologies – more particularly CCTV systems – in surveillance and control dispositives<sup>3</sup> of public spaces, dispositives which (following recent literature<sup>4</sup>) take part in this contemporary transformation of the social regulation. These dispositives would mainly deal with the very present concern of risk identification and anticipation associated with spatial redistribution structured around logics of neutralisation or exclusion of individuals or populations considered « at risk ».

In order to put those hypotheses to the test we have conducted from 2007 to 2010 an empirical research<sup>5</sup> within the Belgian National Railway Company (*Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges*, hereafter SNCB). Over the last ten years, the strategy of SNCB has been to secure spaces (mainly stations and surroundings) by means of a thorough reworking of these spaces, characterised by a redistribution of security resources. In this changing context, SNCB implemented a project named « Malaga »<sup>6</sup>. Based on the use of new technologies this project gives a central role to CCTV.

By tackling this field of study, our aim was to highlight the contribution of CCTV to the safeguarding of the SNCB spaces through an analysis of the devices itself and of its impact on the conduct of people considered to present a risk. At the occasion of this research we found out that the « Malaga » project is not only meant to influence the behaviours of this type of public – from a dissuasive point of view. The use of CCTV proved indeed to be dedicated by SNCB strategists to the conduct of the criminal investigation conducted by the police. It is this conducted policy that we shall analyse more thoroughly.

From this point view, we shall give an account of the circumstances that led the SNCB to opt for an intensive use of new technologies, among which CCTV (2). We shall then put forward the developing strategy articulated between the SNCB security logic and the police demand for the images recorded by SNCB cameras (3). At last we shall end by an analysis of the consequences of this policy on police conduct (4).

## 2. The SNCB technological option in regard to security

The SNCB use of new technologies takes place in a complex process of redistribution inside the company of public and private resources linked to security. This new

3 Like Ceyhan, we use this concept to mean any set of human, legal or material elements made to achieve a specific goal (Ceyhan, 2007, 2). (Ceyhan, 2007, 2).

4 For a report of the English speaking literature on this topic see the text we recently published in the *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie* (Francis, 2008).

5 We successively ran a document analysis, held interviews with top managers in charge of security at SNCB and finally observed the SNCB PC-video central (Francis, 2011). This observation took place during the months of April and May 2010 (150 hours). At the back of the PC-video (SOC) room we had a chair and a table. We shared the operators daily life throughout the day, evening and even at night. We noted the behaviour of the operators as well as the images broadcasted on the screens.

6 *Malaga*: « Moyens d'Acquisitions Locales, d'Acheminement et de Gestion d'Alarmes » for Means of Local Acquisition, Transmission and Alarm Management.

redistribution is the product of an increase of recorded crime in the SNCB spaces. Observed over the last ten years, this phenomenon coincides with a police disinvestment in this matter that can be explained by the 1999 reform of the Belgian police. At this time the Railway police (called SPC<sup>7</sup>) – an autonomous police body until 1999 – was replaced by a specialised service (still called SPC), but this time attached to the brand new Federal police. The manpower of this service was downsized to half. Hence, as one said in the *Corporate Security Service*, its priorities would have become more federal (terrorism, human trafficking<sup>8</sup> and organised crime) than rail related (vandalism, fare dodging, public nuisance...).

Driven by this new set of objectives, the SNCB authorities opted for setting up a security plan supported more by internal resources, directed to the railway company. This concretely led to the creation, besides a classical security service (*B-Security*), of another security service named *Securail*<sup>9</sup> and made up of sworn<sup>10</sup> officials, thus authorized to record statements of offences against railway regulations. They are also allowed<sup>11</sup> to move persons without a valid ticket away from the zones where such a ticket is requested, to perform ID controls and – if necessary – to detain individuals unable to prove their ID until the police intervention. They may as well make use of disabling sprays (in case of self-defence) and even handcuffs in some cases<sup>12</sup>.

In parallel and complementary to the creation of *Securail* the « technological option » inside the « Malaga » plan gradually came into existence from 2001. This plan included the former installation of various alarm systems (anti-intrusion, anti-hold-up, access control alarms through a badge system, alarms in case of unauthorised strongbox opening...) followed from 2006 by a phase of installation in the biggest fifty-one Belgian stations<sup>13</sup> of 3.000 video cameras connected to the SNCB PC-video central called the « Security Operations Centre » – hereafter SOC. Nonetheless this service is not only the mere receptacle of the images treated by the cameras. It is also the physical place from which *Securail* agents control the cameras, process the images, manage the alarm signals and react to the emergency calls issued from the shopfloor (personnel and travellers) through a 24/7 call centre inside the SOC<sup>14</sup>. This call centre is fed by the calls transmitted through the emergency number implemented in all the stations throughout the country. We shall still note that the SOC is also the place from which the coordination of the

7 Acronym forged from an amalgam of French and Dutch words. S stands for *Spoorweg* (Dutch for Railway), P for Police or *Politie* and C for the French *Chemin de Fer* (Railway).

8 Based on our information this issue would not be anymore a priority for the SPC.

9 Created by the Royal Decree of September the 13th, 1999 «*relatif à la sécurité dans les chemins de fer*» The Royal Decree of December the 20<sup>th</sup>, 2007 will further specify its activities.

10 Authorized in the sense of Article 104 of the Law of May the 3d, 1999 «*concernant la répartition des compétences faisant suite à l'intégration des polices aéronautique, maritime et des chemins de fer dans la Police fédérale*» Following this article they are in charge of attending to the respect of the Law of April the 12th, 1835 «*concernant les péages et règlements de Police sur les chemins de fer, ainsi que les arrêtés d'exécution*».

11 Powers based on the Law of April the 10th, 1990 «*réglant la sécurité privée et particulière*» (modified by the Law of December, the 27th, 2004).

12 Article 13.14 of the Law of April 10th, 1990 «*réglant la sécurité privée et particulière*» allows the use of handcuffs in case of physical resistance by a detained person in the sense of article 13.12 of the same Law.

13 Other stations will still be equipped with CCTV. «*The decision has been taken in 2009 on the basis of a thorough security analysis*» (internal document).

14 The call centre has recently been integrated inside the SOC. The convergence point of emergency calls (call centre) was previously separated from the convergence and processing treatment point of.

possible interventions is operated. These interventions are carried out by *Securail* (or *B-Security*) agents, or even by the police in case of trouble on the shop floor.

### 3. Relation between SOC and police within the framework of its criminal investigation activities

All the images captured by the SOC cameras are kept in a storage unit for 7 days. This service, the real memory of the SNCB, is thus capable of offering to the police recordings of the images that are useful to investigations related to the SNCB and its spaces. To account for these changes we shall successively deal with:

- the way the SOC recordings can contribute to the general security strategy of spaces implemented by SNCB (3.1.) ;
- the interest perceived by SNCB to prompt the criminal police to appeal to the SOC recordings (3.2) ;
- lastly, the implementation modalities of the profit-sharing strategy as developed by the Corporate Security Service towards the police (3.3).

#### 3.1. The use of recordings and space safeguarding technique

The results of our research show that the SNCB security strategy can boil down to a form of “preventive requalification of space” aiming at transforming the SNCB spaces through a vast number of techniques (architecture, human presence, signposting, law,...). Those spaces can be turned into defensive (Newman, 1973) or selective spaces (Bauman, 1998) consisting in restricting access to individuals considered « at risk ». The spaces can also be turned into places that create fear (Flusty, 2001; Koskela, 2000), able to generate dissuasive effects and/or effects of removal of the public « at risk ». This space may be defined as an area where the likely cost – in the broad sense – of a deviant behaviour (arrest, detention, punishment ...) is greater than the expected gain – like theft, rape, vandalism,...). In this case, committing a crime is not profitable. The production of this kind of space is directly inspired by the *Rational Subject Doctrine*. This doctrine states that everyone is able to calculate the “cost/benefit” of his actions. Therefore, we are, in this way, “manipulated” (Foucault, 2004 ; Poupart, 2002; Rule, 2002).

SNCB cameras take an essential part in this third type of space transformation. So their mere presence (surveillance) or when they are associated with staff on the ground interventions (information and “remote lead”) are supposed to transform space into a threatening space with dissuasive virtues<sup>15</sup>.

It is precisely within the scope of this strategic framework that one can resort to recordings with a criminal investigative purpose, as do surveillance and ground support. This technique contributes to the same project of requalifying space as frightening. It allows indeed the repressive logic to express itself within the SNCB space making it more frightening to ill-intentioned individuals. It is true that the access to recordings is a valuable resource for the police in its crime investigation framework. It can lead to identify those who committed crime, to know their *modus operandi* and at least to

15 Let's notice that our empirical data, concurring with the literature (Heilman and Mornet, 2001; Heilman, 2003 ; Wacjman, 2010) show us that unless by giving it a magical virtue the camera is by itself not very dissuasive.

collect elements of evidence. The ability to playback in real time is an investigator's old fantasy that becomes true. A person has been attacked... Some train shelter's windows have been broken... To discover what has happened one only needs to replay in real time until the culprit appears. And if, as sometimes happens, a camera is damaged it is still possible with a touch of magic to recover the last images shot and recorded by it, or from another camera placed nearby. The same applies to every other kind of offence. To be able to "retro-tell" the past is for investigators as precious as it is to "foretell" the future for operators in their surveillance tasks.

### 3.2. The SOC recordings: an in-draught for the police

Those in charge of the *Corporate Security Service* are fully aware of the interest for the police created by the recordings. This police interest is strategically used by the railway company which attempts, by offering an access service to the recordings, to promote the presence of agents from the criminal investigation sphere inside its own security field – as we previously observed.

Our study revealed to us how much this "profit-sharing" strategy influences the police whose number of requests for images grows continuously since the service was created. We consider that the success of this profit-sharing approach reflects on the side of the persons in charge of the *Corporate Security Service* a thorough knowledge of the logics behind police actions. These logics are essentially a matter for sociology of work and of organisations mobilized by authors as Lévy, Robert or Monjardet. So it is understood from the works of the latter that any police officer facing an infinite set of tasks (complaints, events, missions imposed by hierarchy or by some other authorities,...) will have to make choices (Monjardet, 1996) i.e. to discriminate among these potential tasks those to be handled in priority, those to be handled if he has some spare time and finally those which he will not deal with. The choice of the tasks to be handled is determined by multiple factors: « the department politics, its own present priorities, the hierarchical position of the person who demands and of the one who is demanded » but also – what will be of a particular interest – by a form of police economics that can be defined as the tendency by police officers to choose the simplest and most economical (in a broad sense) solutions (De Valkeneer & Francis, 2007).

In the context of criminal investigations such a tendency entails a bigger priority to cases where discovery (visibility of the offender or of the offence) seems to be easier than the other choices (Robert and Zauberman, 2004). In other words: when police officers can choose between two cases of equivalent seriousness will tend to arbitrarily choose the one that looks the easiest to solve. Therefore they will be logically attracted to crimes (and to deeds connected to crimes) likeliest to have been caught on video.

### 3.3. The in-draught strategy implemented

In its will to prompt the police to ask the SOC for recorded images, the SNCB favours on one hand, the quality and effectiveness of the service supplied by its operators to meet such requests (3.3.1.), and – on the other hand – a form of advertisement consisting in "praising the product" (3.3.2.).

### 3.3.1. An effective service?

Responding positively to a request for recordings is not as simple as it seems. As the camera captures all that enters its field of vision, the results are a substantial excess of information to be viewed with regard to the purpose of the dispositive<sup>16</sup> (Heilmann, 2007). Thus the recognition of suitable images requires inside the SOC a specific work organisation as well as know-how (deductive mind and knowledge of the stations multiple spaces) more or less quickly achieved, depending on the operators abilities. In this respect some difficulties have to be overcome.

So it is not always easy for the operator to relocate in time the intended images that might have been recorded. When it concerns offences without any direct victim (vandalism) and lacking of information the man behind the screen must proceed by systematic probing in the past until he unpredictably arrives at the right images. An example here is how an operator proceeded when asked by his superior to estimate the closest time when a carriage window had been broken from the inside. The operator watched the recordings of the train in question as it passed through each of the stations (equipped with CCTV) on its route until he identified the first station where the train can be seen with its window broken. Knowing the time of passage of the damaged train in this very station<sup>17</sup>, he has been able to give an interval of time when the damages possibly happened. With the list of the persons present in the carriage at this moment (as witnessed the control officer) the vandals have been identified.

Nonetheless, even when the offence is documented by the victims (theft, assault, rape...), the temporal uncertainty often remains. It is indeed obvious that very few victims think of consulting their watch when an incident happens. One can even sometimes notice that shocked and disorientated victims end up giving information that is incorrect or even misleading. This point is well known amongst operators. They are even given the instructions to broaden the time interval to be explored to at least 5 minutes before and after the time told by the victims. To this temporal uncertainty a spatial inaccuracy must also be added: it is not always simple to identify *ex post* the exact location of the facts.

We also have to note that it happens that the police officers themselves, irrespective of the victims witnessing, treats the victims request with a certain level of inaccuracy in several respects. So we selected by reading the faxes requesting for images transmitted daily to the SOC that the location of the offences – of which police would like images – is at times very approximate. The operator has then to content himself with the sole name of the concerned<sup>18</sup> station or even to contact the applicant back to know a bit more about the case. It also happens that it is the time interval during which the facts took place that is obviously too wide. We once saw a request concerning a time interval of a whole week! It is also possible that the police request can be accurate in terms of time intervals but does not include the nature of the facts or a sufficiently precise description of the suspect

16 McCahill and Norris (2002) mentioned by Heilmann (2007) reported that after the 7/7/2005 London underground attacks more than 50 police officers have been mobilised to identify the bombers. They had to view 25000 hours of images taken by nearly 11000 cameras.

17 The location where the train was at the moment of the offence is an useful information provided that the operator takes possible delays into account. To this end, he may use a special timetable which allows him to know afterwards the exact time of arrival and departure of a train in each station.

18 When it is about a big station covered by hundreds of cameras the request is then untreatable.



to be spotted. In the fax transmitted to the SOC was asked to locate in a big Brussels station « a man of a dark race » ... These inaccuracies from the officers in charge of an investigation sometimes amplifies the impression that the police officers think, as there are cameras, computers and new technologies, that everything has become, as if by magic, easy for the operators – yet this is far from being the case.

Once the facts are more or less traced in time and space, the real research work can begin. First the operator must look up all the cameras that might in any way have recorded the facts or any element related to them. Once the right camera(s) are identified, the operator looks for camera shots that make the suspect(s) as recognisable as can be for later identification. In this respect the useful images are not necessarily the ones of the act itself. If he cannot retrieve the recording of the offence in progress the operator can indeed try to spot the presence of the offender before or after his action. These images compared with the statements of witnesses are often sufficient to close a case. By way of example we noticed during observations that what was most often exposed in suitcase thefts was the chronological succession of two sequences: the one where the suspect is seen entering the station or a train without any luggage and the one where they are seen getting out of it holding their loot. Of course it also happened that the theft has been directly recorded by cameras. The same goes for the persons who committed a physical assault (whose victims are able to give a description of their violator) filmed coming in and going out of a station. The images of their presence on the scene often prove to be a charging element against them as well as the lack of images can exonerate them.

It is then possible to appreciate that the whole ability of the operator consists, more often than not, in tracing back the offenders itineraries before and after the facts committed<sup>19</sup>. This is not an easy job, and it sometimes requires a lot of time, mostly in the larger stations with many circulation options. In this regard we noticed that the operator's knowledge of these spaces, their deductive minds and their tenacity lead them most of the time to find relevant images<sup>20</sup>.

The new technologies of imaging, joined with a know-how mastered by most of the operators, turn the SOC into a true ally for the people in charge of prosecution.

### 3.3.2. Singing the praises of the SOC

Offering the police access to images is not sufficient to attract them to SOC, they still have to be informed of how seriously their request will be treated and how high is the probability to get useful images for their investigations.

This is the reason why SOC operators offer some police departments (essentially railway police) brief guided tours, where a display takes place of what the recordings can bring in terms of prosecution. The police can for instance watch a series of model images that helped to solve quickly criminal cases related to assaults or thefts.

19 The presence of cameras that start shooting automatically in case of movement detection is appreciated by the operators, for they do not have to watch long periods of recordings searching for images of a suspect.

20 Herewith we mean images that can be considered as perfect proof (of the acting out) or, crossed with some other elements of information, that are likely to weigh a court case or on the contrary to exonerate a suspect by proving his absence at the time of the facts.



This kind of visit is punctual and always follows the same pattern. The operators search in an *ad hoc* file for images intended to be used as display (absolute showcases of the SOC know-how). After the display, which is apparently every time very convincing, the police officers are informed about the next steps to be followed and the procedures to be observed when they have to draw up an accurate request for images (using a standard request form mentioning the initial statement's reference number, indications about the searched fact, the presumed time and place, ...). As for the local police departments – too numerous and less exclusively concerned by the security issues within the SNCB – they are informed of the SOC benefits by post.

While the display is by itself a valuable advertisement to draw the police officers, operators themselves persist in finding images useful to investigators. Commendable results (84%<sup>21</sup>) are as well elements that must prompt the police to take the SOC service offer even more seriously. Operators strive to find the requested images as a point of honour. They persevere in searching for the offender by imagining every possible scenario in terms of followed route.

It seems to us that they intend to supply the police with images as confounding as possible and that they are proud when they find it, as was this operator who – after a long search – ends up with a perfect focus on the faces of three carjackers (who went through the station while running away) and this right under the eyes of two police officers which have been losing hope in their search. The operator stood up and ironically said to his colleagues in the room: « It's embarrassing to be this good in front of the police ».

#### 4. Impact on the crime investigation conducts of the police

Our field study permitted us to pick up the impact on the police conducts regarding crime investigation produced by the profit-sharing or seduction strategy set up by the SNCB. It is in fact a true increase of demand for images that the SOC has to face (4.1) which tries to reduce the pressure of it using some minor tricks (4.2).

##### 4.1. Inflation of the demand for images

So everything within the SOC is implemented to offer criminal investigators an effective service. They are not indifferent to this benevolent posture. Initially they seem often impressed or even stunned when they enter the SOC room for the first time and see the multitude of screens. This first impression even increases when the operator later meets their demand for images – which is, as we have seen, often the case.


If the police officers are impressed while coming in the SOC, most of the time they come out delighted. As in this example, when two police officers came and asked the operator to search for images of a theft in a train. By a series of crosschecks, based on the indications given by them, the operator ended up finding the images of the suspect (he is seen stepping in a high-speed train without any luggage and going out holding a suitcase). This magical moment made the two officers jump for joy, and one of them

21 This information circulates through activity reports, during conferences and other study days organised by the *Corporate Security Service*. It might also circulate among police officers.

shared with me his perplexity about how quickly this result has been obtained, adding that he would immediately inform his colleagues.

All things considered, investigators seem to be the actors that this dispositive convinces the most. This “police appeal” does by the way nothing else but grow as the potential of this department becomes well known. This results in a close-to-constant growth in the number of police requests since the department became operational. As shown in the following graph, the requests for images sent by the various Belgian police departments to the SOC increased from a few dozen in 2008 to nearly 200 in 2010 on a monthly basis (March). The requests kept on rising during the observation period (April and May 2010). In relation to this graph we can therefore state that the Railway police are by far the first « customers » of the SOC. This is logic, because of its field of activities essentially dedicated to railway areas. Second come the local police departments whose requests started increasing from 2009, that is from the time when the *Corporate Security Service* sent all the heads of department the SOC letter of presentation previously mentioned (3.3.2). In regard to the federal police – who are not very concerned by the issues related to the railway area – we fairly logically note a relative stability of the numbers, which remain low.

Figure 1: Increase of the record SOC-images requests by the railway police (SPC), local police (LP) and federal police (from January to March 2010)



#### 4.2. SOC: moderating the demand

“Victim of its own success” the SOC sees its operators spend more and more time processing requests for images. These professionals have to watch recordings related to time intervals liable to contain useful information (facts, persons, lack of facts, and lack of a person). This activity is, as we exposed previously, extremely time-consuming especially when the operator lacks accurate information from the police. Finding the right images requires information and skills.

In reaction to this unexpected additional work and without any reasonable perspective of a decreasing demand from the police, a series of strategies have gradually been set

up aimed at influencing the applicants to adopt a conduct that enables the operators research tasks easier. The purpose is to see to it that the police becomes more willing to bring a maximum amount of useful information when they address their request. To reach this objective the people in charge of the SOC have adopted the rule stating that the supply of requested images is only provided if these images are storable on a 700 megabytes CD-Rom. If this capacity is exceeded the applicants must provide their own storage units (external hard drives) on which the images are then stored. According to the operators themselves this rule aims at encouraging the applicants to define as much as possible the relevant time and space limits and in the end to bring them to find a better balance between their desire for images and the amount of work it entails for the operators. When, in despite of this, the request remains inaccurate and of an excessive scale, the operator can merely pass the whole series of the requested time slots without even a viewing. He can also offer the applicant to come and view the time slots personally and to leave only with the relevant images. This last option saves time for the operators to attend to some other tasks and memory space on the applicant's storage device.

These incentives, devised by the persons in charge of the SOC, lead us to refer to a form of "adjustment" in the conduct of the police conducts made essential because of the excessive reactivity of the latter to the SOC attractions and memory. The art of conducting others is also an art of constant adjustment.

## 5. Conclusion

By way of conclusion three points appear to be particularly salient. The first one is about the way the dispositive of safeguarding itself operates. The police investigators turned out to be by far more receptive to the benefits of « Malaga ». All things considered it is not very surprising. It is true that every SNCB security strategist knows better than anyone how a police officer thinks and works. After all, don't they both –professionally speaking – share the similar logic, when they set about making choices in security management? The closer the strategist's logic is to its target's one, the more important its reaction is to the dispositive devised by this strategist.

The second point concerns the present modes of risk management. The in-draught effect set up by the SNCB towards the police within the framework of their crime investigation assignment appears to us as emblematic of how social regulations are conceived in modern societies. By attracting the police on their own ground, SNCB seeks to make their spaces a threat for people who present a risk – in a form of domino effect. Dealing with the deviants is now done by modifying their environment rather than by tackling sociological determinants. By increasing the costs of their deviant behavior, we determine everyone to make the right choice: not to misbehave or to go elsewhere.

To question the real impact of space transformation on deviant behavior (further research shows that the objective threat is not necessarily subjectively felt<sup>22</sup>), one thing is clear, however: this strategy is – and it is our third point – in the heart of the contemporary process of spatial fragmentation, well described in the scientific literature (Bauman, 1999; Koskela, 2000), through which a form of security competition between spaces

22 See Francis (2011).

emerges. Each fragment tries to use at lesser cost all existing resources on the subject, even when they are to be found elsewhere. The police sovereign power gets progressively caught up in a new reorganisation induced by the growing power of private or semi-private operators in the field of public order management (Heilmann, 2007). There might be a matter of concern on a more societal level in the case of the SNCB: it is the even scarcer public resources that are converted and dragged into this fragment of semi-private space. To attract them there the SNCB and its « Malaga » project have created some new sirens with electronic lures.

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